

# Monitoring NBFIs over Time

Yiming Ma

Columbia Business School

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Panel Discussion

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
- The FSB's monitoring report of NBFIs is an incredibly valuable resource for understanding the evolution of financial intermediation
- My students and I have learned much from reading the report and other FSB work over the years - thank you very much!
- Some suggestions
  - ① Incorporate new NBFIs, e.g., stablecoins and private credit funds
  - ② Consistent measurement of NBFIs risk over time
  - ③ Benchmarking NBFIs risk against banking sector risk

# 1. Include New NBFIs: Stablecoins

- Suggest to include new NBFIs that have emerged, grown, and will continue to grow
- 1. Fiat-backed stablecoins
  - Assets: fiat-assets e.g. sovereign bonds, deposits, repos
  - Liabilities: stablecoin tokens

**Total Fiat-Backed Stablecoin Market Capitalization**


2020-2025 | Excluding algorithmic stablecoins



Source: Medium

# 1. Include New NBFIs: Stablecoins

- Stablecoins engage in liquidity transformation like MMFs + ETFs and bear (varying degrees) of run risk



Source: Ma, Zeng, Zhang 24

- Data is available
  - Outstanding stablecoin supply is observable on the blockchain
  - Reserve assets are self-reported, might be regulated going forward

# 1. Include New NBFIs: Private Credit Funds

- 2. Private credit funds
- Illiquid assets funded by claims with varying degrees of redeemability  
→ liquidity transformation + run risk

The screenshot shows a news article from Barron's, dated March 25, 2026. The main headline is "Ares Caps Redemptions as Private Credit Pressures Build" by Bill Alpert. A secondary headline from Reuters is visible: "Apollo private credit fund limits investor withdrawals after requests surge". The page includes navigation links for various market categories and social media sharing options.

- Systematic data is more challenging to obtain

## 2. Consistent Measurements over Time

- As in the past, new NBFIs will continue to emerge going forward
- Monitoring based on economic functions rather than specific entities can better withstand the test of time
- But what about the effects of compositional changes within NBFIs categories?
  - E.g., adding stablecoins would enlarge the narrow measure of NBFIs, but may also change (reduce) the average liquidity mismatch
- Monitoring targets should be designed to be consistent over time even as the composition of NBFIs by economic function is evolving

## 2. A Simple Way for Consistent Measurements over Time

- Currently, we have  $\text{size}_{EF}$  and vulnerability measure $_{EF}$  for each EF
- Could simply compute the weighted sum:

$$\text{Aggregate vulnerability} = \sum_{EF} \text{size}_{EF} \times \text{vulnerability measure}_{EF} \quad (1)$$

- → Robust to compositional changes within each EF over time and across jurisdictions
- → Provides a headline statistic that can be easily communicated
  - Complements the current richness of the report
- → No additional data required

## 2. A Simple Way for Consistent Measurements over Time

- After computing the weighted sum for each vulnerability measure

$$\text{Aggregate vulnerability} = \sum_{EF} \text{size}_{EF} \times \text{vulnerability measure}_{EF} \quad (2)$$


- Could further sum up different aggregate vulnerability measures to form an aggregate risk index *if they are sufficiently independent*
  - E.g., should not add up maturity transformation (MT) and liquidity transformation (LT)
- Note: Methodology inspired by the LMI Index (Bai, Krishnamurthy, and Weymuller 2018) and the LPI Index (Ma, Xiao, and Zeng 2024)

### 3. Benchmarking NBFIs Risk Against Banking Sector Risk

- Could calculate the same aggregate vulnerability measures for the banking sector and present them along with those of NBFIs
- → Helps put NBFIs on the same footing as banks
- → Allows a broader audience to understand the importance and vulnerability of NBFIs, e.g., central banks, bank regulators
- → Captures risk more holistically across the financial intermediary
  - Can detect risk shifting between banks and NBFIs through interlinkages
- Bank data should be mostly available from existing sources

### 3. Benchmarking NBFIs Risk Against Banking Sector Risk

- Sheds light on the right ways to measure risk in the modern financial intermediary
  - Leverage/short-term debt used to capture liquidity risk at banks
  - Liquidity risk arises in NBFIs with minimal leverage like mutual funds
  - Liquidity transformation (LT) is much broader than leverage
- E.g. LPI measures how much liquidity is transformed by \$1 in bank deposits versus \$1 in bond fund shares



Source: Ma, Xiao, and Zeng 2024

# Suggestions

- 1 Incorporate new NBFIs: stablecoins and private credit funds
- 2 Consistent measurement of NBF1 risk over time: size-weighted sum of vulnerability measures
- 3 Benchmarking NBF1 risk: calculate and compare with the same aggregate vulnerability measures for banks

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- 2 Consistent measurement of NBFIs risk over time: size-weighted sum of vulnerability measures
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Thank you once again!

# References

Bai, Jennie, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Charles-Henri Weymuller. "Measuring liquidity mismatch in the banking sector." *The Journal of Finance* 73.1 (2018): 51-93.

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